We consider zero knowledge interactive proofs in a richer, more realistic communication environment. In this setting, one may simultaneously engage in many interactive proofs, and these proofs may take place in an asynchronous fashion. It is known that zero-knowledge is not necessarily preserved in such an environment; we show that for a large class of protocols, it cannot be preserved. Any 4 round (computational) zero-knowledge interactive proof (or argument) for a non-trivial language L is not black-box simulatable in the asynchronous setting.
Introduction
Zero knowledge [16] turned out to be a useful tool for many cryptographic applications. Many works have studied the numerous uses of zero knowledge proofs, and many other works have suggested how to improve the efficiency of these proofs. However, most of these works considered only the case where the proof stands alone, disconnected from the computing environment. An interesting question, which naturally arises these days, is how robust the notion of zero knowledge is in a broader setting. In particular, many computers today are connected through networks (from small local area networks to the entire Internet) in which connections are maintained in parallel asynchronous sessions. It is common to find several connections (such as FTP, Telnet, An internet browser, etc.) running together on a single workstation. Can zero knowledge protocols be trusted in such an environment?
The robustness of zero knowledge has been studied before in the "simple" case of parallel repetitions. It is often desirable to run a probabilistic protocol many times in parallel, usually in order to reduce the expected error of a single run. The alternative of running these protocols sequentially has a cost of increasing the number of rounds NEC and is considered inefficient. It had been noted by several researchers that even in the parallel repetitions case the zero knowledge property does not necessarily hold. Goldreich and Krawczyk [12] proved a general lower bound: Any language that has a three round (black-box) zero-knowledge interactive proof with a negligible error probability (as can be obtained by parallel repetitions) is in BPP. Thus, for example, unless Graph Isomorphism is in BPP, the protocol of [13] for Graph Isomorphism does not remain zero knowledge when run many times in parallel. Several papers have dealt with this problem, usually by letting the verifier commit on it's (non-adaptive) questions in advance [1, 3, 11, 8] .
Our initial feeling was that the protocols that keep their zero knowledge property when run in parallel should also remain zero knowledge even in a multi-session asynchronous environment. However, in this paper, we give some indications that this is not always the case.
Let us say a few words about what we need to show. In order to show that a protocol is zero knowledge in a modern networking environment, one must provide a proof that even within this complicated environment the protocol is still zero knowledge. But for us matters are simpler. We don't need to cover all facets of a networking environment. We only have to show that zero knowledge may fail in a specific setting that is part of this environment. Namely, the environment may be more hostile to the protocol than the specific case we study, but since a protocol fails even with a benign setting, it is definitely not zero knowledge when we extend the power of the environment. In particular, a networking environment may have various protocols running, multiple sessions, more than two parties involved, asynchronous setting, etc.
We show that zero knowledge may fail for a large class of protocols, even if we only run a single protocol between only two parties. We exploit the asynchronicity and the existence of multiple sessions. Clearly, if we also add other features, such as additional parties and other protocols running in parallel, then the security problems can only be amplified.
We show that any four-round black-box zero-knowledge proof with perfect completeness is not zero knowledge even in a very benign setting: The setting in which the protocol is run many times in an asynchronous environment, and an ad- A  s  s  u  m  i  n  g  t  h  e  e  x  i  s  t  e  n  c  e  o  f  o  n  e  -t  o  -o  n  e  o  n  e  -w  a  y  f  u  n  c  -t  i  o  n  s  ,  t  h  e  r  e  e  x  i  s  t  4  -m  e  s  s  a  g  e  (  c  o  m  p  u  t  a  t  i  o  n  a  l  )  z  e  r  o  k  n  o  w  l  -e  d  g  e  a  r  g  u  m  e  n  t  s  f  o  r  a  l  l  N  P  l  a  n  g  u  a  g  e  s  [  8  ]  .  H  o  w  e  v  e  r  ,  t  h  e  r  e   t  h  e  r  e  a  r  e  n  o  4  -m  e  s  s  a  g  e  z  e  r  o  k  n  o  w  l  e  d  g  e  a  r  g  u  m  e  n  t  s  f  o  r  l  a  n  -g  u  a  g  e  s  o  u  t  s  i  d  e  o  f   B  P  P   t  h  a  t  a  r  e  b  l  a  c  k  b  o  x  s  i  m  u  l  a  t  a  b  l  e  i  n   t  h  e  a  s  y  n  c  h  r  o  n  o  u  s  s  e  t  t  i  n  g  .   S  o  m  e  w  o  r  d  s  o  n  t  h  e  t  e  r  m  i  n  o  l  o  g  y  w  e  a  r  e  u  s  i  n  g  .  B  y  z  e  r  o   k  n  o  w  l  e  d  g  e  w  e  m  e  a  n  c  o  m  p  u  t  a  t  i  o  n  a  l  z  e  r  o  k  n  o  w  l  e  d  g  e  ,  i  .  e  .  ,   t  h  e  d  i  s  t  r  i  b  u  t  i  o  n  o  u  t  p  u  t  b  y  t  h  e  s  i  m  u  l  a  t  i  o  n  i  s  p  o  l  y  n  o  m  i  a  l  -t  i  m  e   i  n  d  i  s  t  i  n  g  u  i  s  h  a  b  l  e  f  r  o  m  t  h  e  d  i  s  t  r  i  b  u  t  i  o  n  o  f  t  h  e  v  i  e  w  s  o  f  t  h  e   v  e  r  i  fi  e  r  i  n  t  h  e  o  r  i  g  i  n  a  l  i  n  t  e  r  a  c  t  i  o  n  .  T  h  e  p  r  o  v  e  r  m  a  y  b  e  i  n  -fi  n  i  t  e  l  y  p  o  w  e  r  f  u  l  (  i  .  e  .  ,  a  n  i  n  t  e  r  a  c  t  i  v  e  p  r  o  o  f  )  o  r  i  t  m  a  y  b  e   c  o  m  p  u  t  a  t  i  o  n  a  l  l  y  b  o  u  n  d  e  d  (  i  .  e  .  ,  a  n  a  r  g  u  m  e  n  t  )  .  W  e  c  o  n  s  i  d  e  r   b  l  a  c  k  b  o  x  z  e  r  o  k  n  o  w  l  e  d  g  e  a  s  d  e  fi  n  e  d  b  y  G  o  l  d  r  e  i  c  h  a  n  d  O  r  e  n   [  1  9  ,  1  4  ]  ,  a  n  d  r  e  fi  n  e  d  i  n  [  1  2 ] . 1  .  R  e  l  a  t  e  d  w  o  r  k   T  h  e  r  e  i  s  a  v  a  s  t  l  i  t  e  r  a  t  u  r  e  i  n  t  h  e  d  i  s  t  r  i  b  u  t  e  d  c  o  m  p  u  t  i  n  g   c  o  m  m  u  n  i  t  y  d  e  a  l  i  n  g  w  i  t  h  a  s  y  n  c  h  r  o  n  i  c  i  t  y  .  W  i  t  h  i  n  t  h  e  c  r  y  p  -t  o  l  o  g  y  c  o  m  m  u  n  i  t  y  ,  B  e  t  h  a  n  d  D  e  s  m  e  d  t  [  4  ]  d  i  s  c  u  s  s  s  u  c  h   a  s  y  n  c  h  r  o  n  o  u  s  a  t  t  a  c  k  s  i  n  t  h  e  c  o  n  t  e  x  t  o I  n  S  e  c  t  i  o  n  2  w  e  d  i  s  c  u  s  s  b  l  a  c  k  -b  o  x  s  i  m  u  l  a  t  a  b  i  l  i  t  y  a  n  d  t  h  e   f  r  a  m  e  w  o  r  k  u  s  e  d  b  y  G  o  l  d  r  e  i  c  h  a  n  d  K  r  a  w  c  z  y  k  .  I  n  S  e  c  t  i  o  n  3   w  e  s  h  o  w  h  o  w  t  o  c  o  n  v  e  r  t  a  n  a  s  y  n  c  h  r  o  n  o  u  s  s  i  m  u  l  a  t  o  r  i  n  t  o  a  n   e  f  fi  c  i  e  n  t  p  r  o  v  e  r  .  I  n  S  e  c  t  i  o  n  s  4  a  n  d  5  w  e  a  n  a  l  y  z  e  t  h  e  s  u  c  c  e  s  s   p  r  o  b  a  b  i  l  i  t  y  o  f  t  h  i  s  p  r  o  v  e  r  .  T  h  e  s  e  s  e  c  t  i  o  n  s  a  s  s  u  m  e  a  s  l  i  g  h  t  l  y   r  e  s  t  r  i  c  t  e  d  v  e  r  i  fi  e  r  :  t  h  e  v  e  r  i  fi  e  r  c  a  n  d  e  c  i  d  e  w  h  e  t  h  e  r  o  r  n  o  t  t  o   a  c  c  e  p  t  b  a  s  e  d  o  n  t  h  e  c  o  n  v  e  r  s  a  t  i  o  n  t  h  u  s  f u  s  e  t  h  e  s  e  c  o  n  v  e  r  -s  a  t  i  o  n  s  t  o  g  e  n  e  r  a  t  e  a  s  i  m  u  l  a 
.
ibility with our own), which avoids certain trivial problems in the original expositions.
Definition 1 ([12] , following [19, 14] ) An interactive proof hP;Vi is called blackbox simulation zeroknowledge if for every polynomial p, there exists a probabilistic expected polynomial time oracle machine S p such that for any polynomial size verifierV that uses at most pn random coins on inputs of length n, and for x 2 L, the distributions hP;V ix and MV p x are polynomially indistinguishable.
Remarks: In the above definition,V may be thought of as a circuit (pedantically, a circuit family) that has access to random bits. The size ofV refers toV 's circuit size. It follows that V runs in polynomial time, which is necessary for a meaningful notion of computational zero knowledge, though not for statistical and perfect zero knowledge. By polynomially indistinguishability, we informally mean that no computationally bounded distinguisher can correctly guess whether a random sample came from hP;V ix or SV p x with probability greater than 1 2 + 1 =jxj c for any c, as jxj grows sufficiently large. For statistical and perfect zero knowledge, we allow for unbounded distinguisher; equivalently, we require that the statistical difference between the distribution be negligible (less than 1=jxj c for any c).
In our paper, as in [12] , we only consider deterministiĉ V ; for this class of adversaries, the above definition requires the existence of a single universal simulator, S. At first glance, the limitations on S may seem to force S to be as powerful as a prover. However, S has important advantages over a prover P, allowing it to perform simulations in probabilistic polynomial time. First, it may setV 's coin tosses as it wishes, and even runV on different sets of coin tosses. More importantly, S may conceptually "back up"V to an earlier point in the conversation, and make different statements. This ability derives from S's control of V 's coin tosses; sinceV otherwise operates deterministically, S can rerun it from the beginning, exploring different branches of the conversation tree.
Indeed, all known proofs of zero-knowledge construct black-box simulations. There is no way known to make use of a verifier's internal state, nor to customize simulators based on the description ofV other than by using it as a black box. 1 Thus, given the current state of the art, an impossibility result for black-box zero-knowledge seems to preclude a positive result for the older definitions of zeroknowledge. 1 As one slight exception, [17] proves security against space-bounded verifiers by considering the internal state of the verifiers. However, these techniques do not seem applicable to more standard classes of verifiers.
Black-box verifiers with private random functions
Following [12] , we consider verifiersV that have access to a private random hash function H, that is wired into them and is not directly accessible to the simulator (note thatV is deterministic in that it doesn't use an external source of randomness; its construction is randomized). That is, the simulator may gain only indirect access to H, by observinĝ V 's input/output behavior. For convenience, we assume that for any polynomially bounded n and m, H will take an nbit input and return an m-bit output. In practice, H will be defined for big enough n and m, and its inputs (if short) will be padded to fit the length of H's inputs. Pedantically, we can view H as a family fH m;n g of hash functions; we suppress these subscripts for clarity.
As in [12] , we will think of H as being randomly chosen from a family of hash functions [5] . And as in [12] we do not use the standard pairwise independent family. Instead we use families of hash functions that achieve pnindependence, for some sufficiently large polynomial p. A member H in this family can be described by a string of polynomial length, and it is this string that is wired into the verifier. The polynomial p is set to exceed the running time of the simulator times the length of V 's answers. Thus, even if the simulator poses to V a different query in each of its steps, and if for each query V generates its "random" coins R as the hash of the query, using H, then the simulator will face a verifier that uses a completely random string to answer each of its (different) queries. Of course, if the simulator repeats a query, then the "deterministic" V repeats the same response.
Creating an efficient prover
To prove our main theorem, we construct a particular malicious verifier (pedantically a family of closely related malicious verifiers), with a fixed scheduling strategy (a very similar strategy is used in [6] ). We show that a simulator that successfully simulates the multi-conversation on input
x with high probability can be converted to a probabilistic polynomial prover P S for the original protocol. This prover will cause V to accept x with probability strictly greater than 1=2. Thus, we can use this prover to probabilistically decide whether x 2 L, implying that L 2 BPP.
The attack
Let the original protocol consist of an initial challenge q, followed by a reply, r and a second challenge, s and a final reply t. The original verifier V generates q as a function qx; R of the input and its random coin flips, R. V generates s as a function sx; R; r of the input, R and r (q is implicit given x and R). Finally, V computes a predicate acceptx; q; r; s ; t to determine whether to accept or reject. Note that this restricts the acceptance predicate to being "conversation-based," in which one can tell whether V will accept based on its conversation, without looking at its random coins. In Section 6 we sketch how to eliminate this restriction.
Let k and M be parameters that will be chosen later.
(Both polynomial in the length of the input.) We consider the protocol obtained by performing M proofs in parallel.
Thus, we denote the initial challenge bỹ q = q 1 ; : : : ; q m = qx; R 1 ; : : : ; q x; R m ; whereR = R 1 ; : : : ; R m . We definer;s andt analogously. Finally, we define acceptx;q ;r;s;t to be true iff acceptx; q i ; r i ; s i ; t i for all i, 1 i M. We call such a parallel set of proofs an M-block.
Note that parallel repetition is a special case of scheduling in an asynchronous environment. From now and on, we always use parallel repetitions, i.e., M-blocks proofs, instead of running a single message in each round.
Our attacking verifierV is defined by the value of its private random hash function, H and parameters k and M.V runs a total of k blocks with the prover. We use subscripts to denote the version, e.g.,q i denotes the first question in the ith run of the protocol. The verifier interleaves its challenges so that the sequence of messages appears as q 1 ; r 1 ; q 2 ; r 2 ; : : : ; q k ; r k ; s k ;t k ; s k,1 ;t k,1 ; : : : ; s 1 ;t 1 :
The "random"R i are determined using the hash function, byR i = Hx;q 1 ; r 1 ; : : : ; q i,1 ; r i,1 :
We assume that H returns the correct number of random bits used by V . The questionsq i ands i are defined bỹ q i =qx;R i ands i =sx;R i ; r i . However, if for any i, accept x;q i ; r i ; s i ;t i , thenV aborts immediately, without sendings i,1 ; : : : ; s 1 to the prover.
We can thus view a conversation as consisting of two phases. The generation of constitutes the resolution phase, in which these proofs run their course. We treat these phases quite differently when discussing the simulator.
Note that all the randomness used byV comes from H.
In particular,V doesn't use its random input, to some extent limiting the simulator S's power over it.
The simulator
Our proof is by contradiction: assuming a simulator S we construct an efficient prover P S . We make some assumptions (without loss of generality) about the simulation, and give a convenient way of looking at the workings of the simulator.
First, we assume that whenever S generates a transcript it runs it throughV . That is, before returning q 1 ; r 1 ; q 2 ; r 2 ; : : : ; s 2 ;t 2 ; s 1 ;t 1 ;
S runsV to obtainq 1 , sendsr 1 toV , receivingq 2 , and so on. Clearly, any simulator can be modified to perform in this manner without changing the quality of its simulation. Since our protocols are dialog based, we also assume without loss of generality that the simulator never sendsV a value fort i that would cause it to reject, since it could simply compute for itself thatV would reject.
The proof forest
As it interacts withV , S implicitly generates many partial conversations, not all of which are successfully finished (only one need be). In generating these partial conversations, S typically starts many proofs that may or may not be completed as the simulation proceeds. For our proof, we organize these proofs using a levelled forest, which we call the proof forest. Each vertex v of the graph corresponds to a new M-block that has been initiated between S andV . A vertex v has parametersR;q;r, corresponding to the beginning of a conversation. A vertex on level i k may have zero or more children on level i + 1 ; the proof forest has at most k levels. We adopt the convention that Level 1 of the graph is the "top" level and Level k is the bottom level. Whenever S runs a partial conversatioñ q 1 ; r 1 ; : : : ; q i ; r i ; : : :
throughV , it may be thought of as traversing/creating the proof forest as follows. First, S implicitly generates R 1 ; : : : ; R i . S will visit or create a sequence of vertices v 1 ; : : : ; v i , where v j is on level j. First, S visits or creates the top level vertex v 1 with parameters R 1 ; q 1 ; r 1 . Then, for 1 j i, after visiting/creating v j,1 , S visits/creates v j , the unique child of v j,1 with parameters R j ; q j ; r j .
Note for example, that all siblings vertices will have the same values forR andq, as will all the top level vertices. To avoid special cases, we adopt the convention that the top level vertices are siblings.
A simulated partial conversation of the form q 1 ; r 1 ; : : : ; q k ; r k ; s k ;t k ; : : : ; s i ;t i ; : : : may be though of as follows. First, the simulator traverses/creates a path from the top level to some bottomlevel vertex v, with parameters R k ; q k ; r k , of the proof forest. At this point, it has simulatedq 1 ; r 1 ; : : : ; q k ; r k . When it runsV further, receivings k =sx;R k ; r k , it is said to activate v. When it sends an acceptablet k toV , it is said to resolve v. When it receivess k,1 it conceptually activates v's parent, and so on. S thus may be thought of as retracing its path back up the proof forest. The simulation may, without loss of generality be viewed as a series of such bounces. In general, S may retrace partially, then continue down another path -but insisting that S "start over" from the top level of the forest does not impair S's efficiency (by more than a polynomial factor) or correctness (sinceV is deterministic).
Turning a simulator into a prover: Overview
We give a high-level overview of how to convert a good simulator S into an efficient prover P S . We can view our S;V interaction as generating and playing (not always to completion) many different proofs of the original protocol.
On a very high level, our efficient prover P S "splices in" its interaction with V and uses the answers created by the simulator as its own. When V chooses a random R and send its first challenge, q, to P S , P S conceptually alters the random hash function H so that for some set of siblings in the proof forest, with parameters R = R 1 ; : : : ; R M ; q = q 1 ; : : : ; q M ; ; R j = R for some j, 1 j M, and hence q j = q. One of these siblings v in particular, with parameter R;q;r will be chosen. Under the right circumstances, P S will send V the value of r = r j ; great care must be taken to choose when to do so.
Later in the simulation, v may be activated, generating s; P S will send r to V , receive s and splice in s j = s. Hopefully, S will eventually respond with an acceptablet; allowing P S to forward t = t j , causing V to accept.
The splicing attempt will have three possible outcomes: P S can succeed in making V accept, P S can fail (get stuck), losing its chance to make V accept, or P S can abort, without causing V to accept, but giving it the chance to try again. Nearly all the time, P S will abort. With some small probability, P S will succeed and with some (hopefully much smaller) probability, P S will fail. We show that for most R, P S will succeed more often than it will fail, and can therefore try this splicing procedure repeatedly, ultimately succeeding with probability at least 2=3.
There are a number of difficulties with the above approach. First, S doesn't know R, so it can't really alter H as described. We observe that, barring certain bad events, S can usually simulate the behavior of the splicedV . A more technically difficult problem is that the simulator may generate many proofs that it never completes. Indeed, the ratio of completed proofs to uncompleted proofs may be quite small (though nonnegligible). If P S sendsr v to V , and S fails to generate an acceptablet v , P S will not be able to cause V to accept.
To get around the problem of incomplete proofs, we have P S use a strategy that allows it to abort a splicing attempt before it has responded to V . We also have P S choose where to insert the real proof into the proof forest according to a particular distribution. We show that using these two techniques, P S may often abort but will only rarely fail.
Remark: If the original proof system has negligible error, then it suffices for P S to succeed with nonnegligible probability. Given such an efficient P S , one can run the proof many times to determine whether an input x is in the language. Given an interactive proof with error bounded away from 1, one can run it in parallel to obtain a proof with negligible error. This gives a simpler proof of our theorem for this case, and can be used to extend the theorem to work for 5 message interactive proofs [18] . Unfortunately, in the argument model, parallel amplification doesn't always work [2] , so we can't use this trick to obtain a general theorem.
Splicing in the proof
Let us first state more explicitly how the splicing operation works. In the proof system, V flips coins to generate R, and generates an initial challenge q = qx; R. P S conceptually chooses a random hash function H, defininĝ V . P S can simply randomly generate new values of H as needed on the fly. Thus, P S can simulateV . P S then runs S;V , which starts generating the proof forest. Recall that if S runs through the partial conversationq 1 ; r 1 ; : : : ; r i,1 and "asks"V for the next questionq i ,V then computes its parametersr andq bỹ R = Hx; 1 ; q 1 ; r 1 ; : : : ; q i,1 ; r i,1 ; and q =qx;R: WritingR = R 1 ; : : : ; R M , Define spliceR; j; R to be the M-tuple equal toR at every coordinate accept the jth, which is equal to R. The splice operation takes place when P S randomly chooses j, 1 j m and conceptually defines Hx;q 1 ; r 1 ; : : : ; q i,1 ; r i,1 = spliceR; j; R; and hence R j = R. Then, conceptually, P S just lets S continue with the simulation (we show below the mechanics of how P S can do this).
The splice operations assures that a set of siblings will have the above values ofR andq; we call these critical vertices. At most one of these siblings, v, will be chosen to generate the conversation with V .
If v is later activated,V generatess = s 1 ; : : : ; s M . To simulate the splicedV (V using the spliced H), P S sends r = r j to V , receives s and sets s j = s. Here is where P S suffers from not knowing R, which would allow P S to compute s j by itself. It uses V to perform this computation for it, but note that this trick may be performed only once (and at great risk) and P S cannot waste it on a sibling of v. So, if a sibling of v is activated before v is activated, P S aborts. Note that in this case, P S has a chance to try again, since no r has been sent to V . If a sibling of v is activated after v is activated, we assume that P S fails (though it may have actually solved the protocol).
If S resolves v, generating a value oft = t 1 ; : : : ; t M that will cause the splicedV to accept, then P S sends t to V . At this point, P S succeeds (Here we use the fact that S only sends an acceptablet).
Except for choosing where to splice in the proof, we have specified P S . It can be verified that, at least up to the point where P S aborts, P S correctly implements the behavior of the simulator with the spliced H.
Choosing v
We define the height of a vertex at level i to be h = k , i + 1 . Our method for choosing which special vertex v to splice in the conversation with V obeys the following design criteria:
The probability that a generated vertex v is the special one depends only on its height, and is completely independent of any other aspect of the entire run of S.
If v has height h, it's probability will be proportional to fh, for some carefully chosen f. First, we note that S must run in an expected number of steps at most nkM , where n = jxj and is some constant. Since P always causesV to accept, S must causeV to accept (that is, generate a path going all the way down and then all the way up the proof forest) with probability close to 1. By Markoff's inequality, if we only allow S to run for N = 100nkM steps, it will still succeed with probability greater than :9 (though its simulation will no longer be close to the actual one). However, our analysis will only consider whether S causesV to accept. For the rest of the analysis, S will only run for N steps.
With S as above, every level has at most N vertices and every vertex has at most N children. We use the following addressing scheme for the vertices of the proof forest. For uniformity, imagine a dummy vertex at Level 0 that has all the Level 1 vertices as children. As each vertex v level i we keep track of how many vertices have been generated on the same level as v and how many siblings of v have been generated. To each vertex v we assign an address i; a; b, denoting that v is on level i and is the bth child of the ath level i,1 vertex generated (top level vertices have addresses of the form 1; 1; b ) . We choose the address of v by first picking a level i with probability cfh, where h = k,i+ 1 and c is the normalizing constant defined by P k h=1 cfh = 1, and choosing a and b uniformly subject to 1 a; b M.
Thus, any address of height h is selected with probability cfh=N 2 .
The precise function f is a polynomial chosen to make the analysis work out; we defer its determination to that section.
Preliminary analysis of the splicing operation
We now bound below the probability that P S succeeds and the ratio of the probability that P S succeeds to the probability that P S fails when R is chosen uniformly. As discussed later, this is not sufficient to prove our theorem, but is a very good start. That is, we consider the following experiment.
EXPERIMENT 1: Execute the following steps:
1. Choose a random address i; a; b as above. 2. Choose R uniformly (over strings of the appropriate length) and run V with R. 3. Generate and traverse the proof forest by running P S , choosing i; a; b as the address of the special vertex v, and splice accordingly.
We assume that the representation of the proof forest generation/traversal keeps track of the order in which vertices are generated/visited. Given this information, we can determine whether a vertex has been activated or resolved. We also assume, for the sake of the analysis, that the simulation continues even if P S fails. That is, once we splice the game in, we allow P S to query V multiple times. Of course, we have to take into account the fact that P S really failed in this case.
Definition 2
We say that an address i; a; b is good iff the vertex at that address is resolved and no sibling vertex (with address i; a; b 0 ) is ever activated. We say that i; a; b is bad iff the vertex at that address is activated but not resolved or if any sibling vertex is ever activated. We say that i; a; b is interesting if it is either good or bad. We say that a vertex is good/bad/interesting if its address is good/bad/interesting. Now, we observe that when R is chosen uniformly, all the splicing operation does is conceptually replace a uniformly chosen value (of the hash function) with another uniformly chosen value. It follows that any value of i; a; b yields the same distribution on how the forest is generated and traversed, and this distribution is the same as if we never spliced in a game. We can therefore reorder the steps of the experiment as follows.
EXPERIMENT 2: Execute the following steps:
1. Generate and traverse the proof forest by running S. 2. Choose a random address i; a; b as above.
Note that the notion of being activated and resolved is simply a property of the forest generation/traversal, and is therefore still well defined. Lemma 2 follows from the above discussion and a straightforward application of Bayes theorem.
Lemma 2
The probability that P S succeeds is bounded below by the probability that i; a; b is good after performing Experiment 2. The probability that P S fails is bounded above by the probability that i; a; b is bad after performing Experiment 2.
The event that i; a; b is good is equal to the sum over all good addresses i 0 ; a 0 ; b 0 of the probability that i; a; b = i 0 ; a 0 ; b 0 (and similarly for the probability that i; a; b is bad. We can thus recast Lemma 2 as the following calculation. Consider the random variables SUCCEED Note that interesting = succeed + fail. We will bastardize terminology slightly, and speak of these variables after a given generation/traversal of a proof forest.
Lemma 3
The probability that P S will succeed is at least Esucceed and the probability that P S will fail is at most Efail.
To bound these expectations, we need to consider the structure of good and bad addresses.
The structure of bad and good addresses
We note thatV will not ask the second question for a level-i proof for i k unless one of its children (in the proof forest) has been completed andV accepts. As a consequence, any interesting vertex has to have a child vertex that is resolved. This implies some structure to the set of good and bad addresses.
Definition 3
A snake is a series of vertices v i ; v i+1 ; : : : ; v k such that v j is on level j and v j+1 is a child of v j for i j k . We call v i the head of and v i+1 ; : : : ; v k the body of . We define the height h to be k , i + 1 (the height of 's head).
Lemma 4 After any generation/traversal of a proof forest, the set of interesting vertices can be canonically decomposed into disjoint snakes such that
Any bad vertex with no bad siblings is at the head of a snake.
Given a set of bad siblings, at most one is in the body of a snake.
Proof: (Sketch) From each interesting vertex v without an interesting parent, we start a snake, with v as the head. If v is on level k we're done, else v must have one or more interesting children. In some canonical fashion, choose one to recursively continue the snake, and start new snakes at the other siblings. The properties required by Lemma 4 are easily verified. 2 Given a canonical snake decomposition of the interesting vertices of a graph, we can bound FAIL and INTERESTING as follows. Let Fi = P i j=1 fi. Proof: (Sketch) To establish the bound for FAIL, note that cfh =N 2 is simply cfk , i + 1 =N 2 , where i is the level of 's head. A lone bad vertex (without a bad sibling) is therefore counted in the summation. Given a set of bad siblings, one of them may not be counted; the worst case is when there are exactly two bad siblings of which one is the head of the snake but the other isn't. However, this undercounting is compensated by the 2 in front of the summation. To establish the bound for INTERESTING, note that cFh =N 2 simply sums the contribution of each vertex in the snake. 2
Setting the parameters
We set fh = h , for a sufficiently large , to be determined. It is easy to verify that Fh h +1 = , and hence Fh=fh h= .
Definition 4
We say that a snake is short if h 10 and long otherwise. 
, fail , c10 =N
The last inequality follows because there are at most N snakes in the decomposition. By the linearity of expectation and simple algebra, we have Efail Einteresting=5 + c10 =5N: (2) Now, if the constant term were 0, this would imply that we succeed much more than we fail, since Einteresting = Esucceed + Efail. To deal with the constant term, we bound Einteresting from below.
Lemma 6
Einteresting :9cFk=N 2 :9ck +1 = N 2 .
Proof: Whenever S succeeds in finishing all k games, there is a snake of height k (from the bottom to the top); the term in the statement of the lemma is the contribution of this snake. S succeeds with probability at least .9. 2
We now set the parameters k;Mand . Let M = k 3 and k = n = jxj. Thus, N = 100k 5 and c = 1 =k O1 . We want to make small the ratio c10 =5N :9ck +1 = N 2 = 20k 5 10 :9k +1 :
We can set to be a sufficiently large integer so that for sufficiently large n (and hence sufficiently large k) this ratio is less than :01.
Finally, Lemma 7 follows from Lemma 6, Equation 2 and the setting of the parameters. Lemma 7 P S succeeds with probability 1=k for some constant . Furthermore, P S succeeds at least 3 times as often as P S fails.
Showing success for most R
Naively, one might suppose that Lemma 7 would imply that we are done. Given an input x 2 L, P S keeps on trying the splicing strategy (with the parameters determined above) until it succeeds or fails. It will conclude in expected polynomial time and it will succeed with probability at least 3=4, implying that L 2 BPP. However, this analysis would only hold if V chose R independently for each of P S attempts; in reality, V chooses R once. The problem is that the previous section bounds the expected success rates over all R. However, it might be that for a very small fraction of R, P S succeeds much more often than it fails, yet for the rest of the R, P S fails more often than it succeeds.
However, note that each vertex in the proof forest corresponds to M = k 3 original proofs, of which at most one is altered by the splicing operation. We exploit this fact to show that for nearly all R, the success and failure probabilities are multiplicatively close to the expected values.
Lemma 8
For all but measure :01 of the random strings R, P S succeeds with probability 1=k for some constant . Furthermore, for all but measure :01 of the random strings R, P S succeeds at least 2 times as often as P S fails.
Remark: By setting parameters correctly, the 2 can be replaced by anything less than the corresponding value in Lemma 7. In turn, this value (set arbitrarily at 3) can be set to any constant (or indeed, can be polynomially large, with care). Similarly, the :01 may be made arbitrarily (though nonnegligibly) small.
Let us explain why Lemma 8 is sufficient for proving our result. If V chooses a "bad" random string, that doesn't behave like most random strings, then we give up and assume that P S fails. But this only happens with probability :02. The rest of the time, the naive argument sketched above does indeed hold; and hence P S will succeed with probability close to 2=3.
Let R denote the set of V 's possible coin tosses and R 0 denote an arbitrary arbitrary subset of R of measure at least :01 (that is, a uniformly chosen R is in R 0 with probability at least :01). Let D denote the uniform probability measure on R M and let D 0 denote probability measure obtained by choosing R 1 ; : : : ; R M uniformly, choosing j, 1 j M uniformly, and then replacing R j by a uniformly chosen element of R 0 . Lemma 9 says that these measures are multiplicatively close over most elements of their domain. butions can be used to show that holds with all but negligible probability under both D and D 0 (here we use the fact that is reasonably large). 2
We use Lemma 9 to argue that the bounds in Lemma 7
hold for most random R. and then choose them with the correct probabilities, conditioned on H and their a priori distributions. If H were uniformly distributed, and for all H, the conditional distribution on i; a; b were the same as the a priori distribution on i; a; b, then we could simply use the analysis of Experiment 2 of the previous section. Now, of course, H is not uniform and the conditional distribution on i; a; b is not the same as the a priori distribution. However, using Lemma 9, it follows that for all but a negligible measure of functions H, the probability that H is chosen is within a multiplicative 1 1=k factor of the uniform probability, for all i; a; b; we call such an H balanced. We can safely neglect the case where H is not balanced. Using Bayes rule, the conditional probability of i; a; b given a balanced H is within a 1 O1=k multiplicative factor of its a priori distribution. It follows that the probability that i; a; b is good or bad is within a 1 + O1=k multiplicative factor of the corresponding probability in the ideal case (plus or minus a negligible additive factor we can safely ignore). Hence, the success and failure probabilities of P S differ from the ideal case by only (essentially) 1+O1=k multiplicative factors. 2
Generalizing the interactive proofs
The proof as we have written it required that S never giveV answers that would cause it to reject. We need this, because otherwise S might give many final answers for the spliced proof, only one of which is actually good, but P S would have no way of knowing which of these answers to forward back to V . If it is apparent from the conversation whether V would accept, this is not a problem, since S need not send a bad answer and P S could filter them anyway.
Every one-sided protocol we know of has this property, but for completeness we would like to eliminate this condition.
Suppose that S is giving the answers for the M-block of proofs of which the real one is buried. Now, P S can evaluate these answers for all but the one proof it cares about, since it knows the random string of the M , 1 simulated verifiers. If it detects a single mistake, it knows that the simulatedV will reject (it requires that all the proofs in an M-block accept before it accepts). Hence, it can continue the simulation ofV without making any calls to V . Now, given that the chosen vertex v of the game forest is been visited, it could turn out to be either good or bad (depending on whether it is resolved or its siblings are activated). When v is bad, we already assume the worst case (P S fails). When v is good, then in the previous analysis, P S succeeded in getting V to accept with probability 1. We can't achieve this success rate, but if P S can succeed with probability at least :99 (this can be made arbitrarily close to 1) the previous analysis won't be materially affected.
By the definition of a good vertex, S eventually gives a set of M correct answers, since it causesV to accept. Since P S is running subsimulations of all but at most one of the verifiers (the one it cares about), it can check all but at most one of the answers (the one it cares about) to see if they make the verifier accept. A naive strategy is for P S to wait until all the M , 1 answers it can check are correct (cause the simulated V to accept), and then use the remaining answer. However, this strategy is not good. Suppose that before giving a set of all correct answers, S gives M sets of answers such that in the ith set all but the ith answer is correct. In this case, P S will always detect this mistake, and not use the remaining (correct) answer, until the one set occurs in which the answer it cares about is wrong. It will then use this bad answer. By a similar argument, any sharp threshold criteria is subject to this problem.
We instead employ a randomized strategy. If m out of the M , 1 checkable answers are incorrect, we use the remaining answer with probability ,m , where is a constant slightly smaller than 1 ( = :999 suffices).
By the definition of a good vertex, eventually P S will see a set of answers with no detected mistakes and use the remaining answer. Thus, it will eventually try an answer. Lemma 10 states that this method works.
Lemma 10
For a set of all but measure :01 of the random coin tosses R, conditioned on the i; a; b chosen by P S being a good address, P S will go on to cause V to accept with probability at least :99.
(proof omitted)
